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Two very different contractual structures are commonly observed in service industries with conges-
tion effects: service level guarantees (SLGs) and best effort (BE) service. We analyze the impact
of these contractual agreements on market outcomes in oligopolistic industries. First, we consider
a model where firms compete by setting prices and SLGs simultaneously. The SLG is a contractual
obligation on the part of the service provider: regardless of how many customers subscribe, the
firm is responsible for investing so that the congestion experienced by all subscribers is equal to
the SLG. We then consider the BE contractual model where firms compete by setting prices and
investment levels simultaneously. With BE contractual agreements, firms provide the best possi-
ble service given their infrastructure, but without an explicit guarantee. Using the Nash equilibria
(NE) of the games played by firms, we compare these competitive models in terms of the resulting
prices, service levels, firms’ profits, and consumers’ surplus.
We first show that the SLG game can be reduced to a standard pricing game, greatly simplifying
the analysis of this otherwise complex competitive scenario. We then compare the SLG game with
the BE game; equilibria for the BE is characterized in a previous paper. Using these results we
show that in the case of constant returns to investment, while the NE price for the SLG game
is perfectly competitive, firms obtain positive markups in the unique NE for the BE game. We
also study the firms’ choice of the strategy space, i.e., whether to offer SLG or BE contracts
to the consumer, and find that competition is intensified if even one firm chooses to offer SLG
contracts. Our results contribute to the basic understanding of competition and contracting in
service industries and yield insight into business and policy considerations.
1. Introduction
Two very different contractual structures are commonly observed in service industries with conges-
tion effects: service level guarantees (SLGs), and best effort (BE) service. The SLG is a contractual
obligation on the part of the service provider: regardless of how many customers subscribe, the
firm is responsible for investing in infrastructure, capacity, or service quality so that the conges-
tion experienced by all subscribers is equal to the SLG. Examples of such guarantees abound; for
example, UPS and FedEx offer overnight delivery guarantees for their premium services. Web
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service providers will often deliver service level guarantees on web server availability. By con-
trast, in other industries firms offer a best effort contractual agreement, where firms provide the
best possible service given their infrastructure, but without an explicit guarantee. For example,
in telecommunications, for the average consumer of Internet service, network service providers
typically do not offer guarantees to purchasers of network service.
This paper studies the following range of questions: In a competitive setting, which of these
two contractual agreements give rise to more intense competition, and thus lower prices and higher
service levels? Which contractual agreement is most beneficial for firms? Which one is most
beneficial for consumers? When do SLGs emerge endogenously as a result of competition? We
address these questions by comparing the two competitive models through the Nash equilibria
(NE) of the respective games played by firms. Our results contribute to the basic understanding
of competition and contracting in service industries and yield insight into business and policy
considerations as we explain below. For example, while the Internet has traditionally employed a
BE service model, network service providers face increasing pressure to deliver end-to-end SLGs
to users, as these are required to meet the increasing needs of real-time traffic such as video and
voice applications (The Economist 2006). Since the emergence of SLGs would be a shift in the
underlying competitive paradigm of the industry, we believe that any industry analysis over these
strategic decisions should consider models such as those in our paper.
Our oligopoly model consists of a finite collection of providers that compete to deliver a service
with congestion effects: the benefits consumers experience are offset by a negative externality that
is increasing in the total volume of customers served. We consider a model where a consumer’s
demand depends on the full price, which is a sum of two components: the price of the service,
and a congestion cost that increases with the total number of consumers subscribing to the same
firm. Firms can invest in their service (e.g., through infrastructure or capacity); investment lowers
the congestion cost experienced by consumers. This model is relevant to a wide range of services,
including transportation, cellular telephony, data networking services, and call centers.
We first define and study a SLG game where firms simultaneously choose two decision vari-
ables: price and a SLG. Demands are allocated based on the chosen prices and SLGs, and then
firms make the necessary investment expenditures to meet their SLGs. We show that under very
general conditions, the SLG game can be reduced to a standard pricing game, but with a modified
cost function that can be explicitly characterized in terms of the model parameters. Additionally,
we show that for a broad class of relevant congestion cost functions, the resulting equivalent pric-
ing game is in fact pricing with convex costs. Moreover, we find that when the original game
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exhibits constant returns to investment—a property satisfied by a wide range of congestion mod-
els, including loss systems—the resulting equivalent pricing game yields constant marginal costs.
If, additionally, services are perfect substitutes, we obtain standard Bertrand competition among
firms. These analytical insights dramatically reduce the complexity of analyzing competition in
SLGs in service industries, as standard results from pricing games can be used to characterize the
NE for the SLG game. Our analytical results here are a novel contribution to the study of such
games in their own right.
Having characterized the SLG game, we undertake a comparison of the equilibrium outcomes
of the SLG game with those of a BE game, formulated and studied by Weintraub et al. (2007)
and in a special case by Xiao et al. (2007). In the BE game firms set prices and investment levels
simultaneously, and then consumers choose their service providers. There are no explicit guar-
antees on service levels. If firms are ex-ante symmetric, and services are perfect substitutes and
exhibit constant returns to investment, we find a sharp prediction: while the NE price for the SLG
game is perfectly competitive and all firms obtain zero profits, firms obtain positive markups in the
unique NE for the BE game. In the SLG game, the total number of consumers served is socially
efficient. In the BE game, because the full price is higher, the number of consumers is below the
socially efficient level. Price competition is more intense in the SLG game than in the BE game;
in the former firms cannot exercise market power. We also compare both models for alternative
cost structures. Our comparisons are similar in spirit to the well known difference between price
competition and quantity competition in standard oligopoly games (Vives 2001). We emphasize,
however, that while the SLG game can be reduced to an equivalent pricing game, the BE game
cannot be reduced to an equivalent quantity competition game.
We conclude by considering the firms’ choice of contractual agreement. In many cases, one of
the most important strategic decisions made by firms is which contractual agreement they will offer
to customers: a SLG or BE service. Motivated by this fact, we also consider a multistage game
where firms can first choose their strategic variable to be either SLG or investment, in addition to
price. In the second stage, each firm chooses its actions: either a price and investment level, or
a price and SLG. For constant returns to investment, we find that if even one firm chooses to set
price and a SLG, then in any resulting second stage NE, all firms obtain zero profits. Thus the only
subgame perfect equilibrium where all firms make positive profits is the one where all firms choose
prices and investments at the second stage. Our result implies that if all other firms have chosen to
compete by offering prices and investment levels, a deviation to offer SLGs is not profitable.
Our model and results provide a broad framework within which a range of service industries
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can be studied. Our attention to both the cost structure and the form of contracts with consumers
offers guidance for policy analysis and business strategy. In particular, we have obtained strong
insights for industries where constant returns to investment can be surmised to hold. As previously
mentioned, such models include examples where loss and blocking probabilities are measures of
user satisfaction. This is the case in many important telecommunication markets, including those
for wireless services (Campo-Rembado and Sundararajan 2004). In such industries, our insights
suggest that competition in prices and SLGs is stronger than competition in prices and investment
levels. When firms compete in prices and SLGs, prices are perfectly competitive, firms obtain zero
profits, and social welfare is maximized. When firms compete in prices and investment levels, they
can sustain mark-ups and make positive profits, full prices are higher, and the number of consumers
served is below the socially efficient level. Thus competition in prices and SLGs is harsh for firms,
and beneficial for consumers, relative to competition in prices and investment levels. Additionally,
our results suggest that in this case, providers would not have incentives to deviate from a BE
contracting model to offer SLGs, if customers are homogeneous in how they trade off money and
congestion (as we have assumed in our model). Thus we expect that SLGs can only be profitable if
customers have heterogeneous preferences, in which case we expect that SLGs can help to segment
the market.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss related results in
the literature. We introduce our model in Section 3. In Section 4, we analyze equilibria for the
SLG game. In Section 5 we compare the SLG game with the BE game. In Section 6 we analyze
the firms’ choice of contractual agreement. Finally, Section 7 presents conclusions and directions
for future research.
2. Related Work
Our results contribute to the recent literature in operations management that studies competition in
service industries with SLGs (see Allon and Federgruen 2005a,b, 2006, Cachon and Harker 2002,
So 2000, for a survey). These papers, with the exception of Cachon and Harker (2002), do not
assume that price and congestion cost can be aggregated in a full price. Thus our equivalency with
a pricing game result is not valid in their settings. Additionally, none of these papers compare
different contractual models (SLGs versus BE) as we do in this paper. In their series of papers,
Allon and Federgruen study competition between oligopolistic firms that compete by setting prices
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and service levels (defined as the difference between an industry benchmark and the firm’s actual
SLG). They characterize equilibria for a rich set of models that consider: (1) different timing of
decisions; (2) different congestion cost functions derived from queuing waiting time expressions;
and (3) multiple customer segments.
While the objectives are very different, our model and analysis has similarities with Cachon
and Harker (2002). Their work analyzes competition and outsourcing in industries that exhibit
increasing returns to investment. In our work, we compare two different contractual structures in
industries that exhibit nonincreasing returns to investment. Cachon and Harker (2002) assume that
consumers’ demand depends on the full price, as we do in our paper. They consider a duopoly
pricing model with scale economies; firms incur a cost that is a concave monomial in the served
demand. The authors show that two different specific game structures can be fit into this model:
a queueing game where consumers’ congestion cost is given by the M/M/1 delay function; and
an EOQ (economic order quantity) game. The former game is a special case of the general class
of games studied in this paper.1 Indeed, in our paper, we derive a systematic and general way of
reducing the SLG game to an equivalent pricing game with a modified cost function under weak
assumptions. In particular, we derive an explicit expression for the modified cost function, and
discuss its convexity/concavity properties for a broad range of congestion models.
Our paper is also related to the growing recent literature on welfare analysis in congestion
games in transportation and communication networks; see Acemoglu and Ozdaglar (2006), Ozdaglar
(2006) (who analyze a pricing game), and Roughgarden (2005) for an overview. Most closely re-
lated to our paper is the work of Weintraub et al. (2007) and Xiao et al. (2007), who, as discussed
in the introduction, analyze the BE game. We use these results to compare the BE game with the
SLG game.
Miller and Pazgal (2006) study a two-stage game where in the first stage firms can choose
between specifying an “output” strategy (a goal that they will reach at any cost) or an “input”
strategy (the cost that they are willing to incur in pursuit of their goal). While our model and
purpose is very different, our analysis of the two-stage game in Section 6 is similar in spirit to
Miller and Pazgal (2006), where SLG is like an output strategy and investment is like an input
strategy. Our analysis is also related to the price vs. quantity competition studies of Singh and Vives
(1984) and Cheng (1985). They show that for a broad range of reasonable demand structures, it is
a dominant strategy for the players to choose to set quantities (as opposed to prices) when goods
1In the EOQ game studied by Cachon and Harker (2002), there is an industry standard such that firms offer a zero
SLG. Hence, firms compete via explicit prices only.
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are substitutes.
3. Model
In this section we introduce our model of service provision. In Sections 3.1 and 3.2 we use
this model to define the SLG game and the BE game, respectively. Suppose there are N profit-
maximizing incumbent firms that compete for consumers. The benefits consumers experience are
offset by a negative externality that is increasing in the total volume of consumers served. How-
ever, firms can invest to mitigate this congestion effect. We assume there are no externalities among
firms; therefore, consumers served by firm j are unaffected by the investments of firms other than
j.
For firm j, we let pj , Ij , and qj denote, respectively, the price per consumer charged, the
investment level chosen, and the number of consumers served. We let bj(qj) be the nonnegative
production cost for firm j. Each investment level Ij is measured in currency units, and the resulting
physical capacity can be a nonlinear function of this investment expenditure. Hence, the profit of
firm j is given by
(1) pij(pj, Ij, qj) = pjqj − bj(qj)− Ij.
Thus profits of firms are determined by the price, investment expenditure, and number of con-
sumers served.
The demand side of the market formalizes a congestion externality among consumers sub-
scribed to the same service provider. We assume that when firm j invests at a level Ij and serves
qj consumers, all customers of that firm experience a congestion cost `j(qj, Ij). The congestion
function `j(qj, Ij) represents the disutility perceived by consumers due to congestion. For each j,
the function `j(qj, Ij) is nonnegative; it is increasing in qj , incorporating the congestion effect into
the model; and it is decreasing in Ij , incorporating the effect of investment.
We assume that the disutility from congestion is measured in monetary units; thus a consumer
will be sensitive to the sum of price and congestion, which we call the full price. The full price
experienced by a customer of firm j is defined as fj = pj + `j(qj, Ij). The full price is the actual
price paid plus the disutility perceived due to congestion. The assumption implies that consumers
are homogenous in how they trade off money and congestion. This is a common simplifying
assumption in competition models with congestion effects (e.g., Xiao et al. 2007, Weintraub et al.
2007, Acemoglu and Ozdaglar 2006, Cachon and Harker 2002).
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For later reference, we define vj as follows:
(2) vj(qj) ≡ min
Ij≥0
qj`j(qj, Ij) + Ij
The function `j(qj, Ij) represents the congestion cost experienced per unit mass of consumers.
Hence, qj`j(qj, Ij) represents the sum of congestion costs experienced by all subscribers to firm
j. Therefore, vj(qj) is the minimum sum of total congestion cost and investment cost for a given
mass of consumers qj . We introduce the following assumption.
Assumption 1. For all j and for all qj ≥ 0, the minimization problem (2) admits a unique optimal
solution.
Assumption 1 is kept throughout the paper. For all j and qj ≥ 0, we let Ij(qj) be the solution
of problem (2). Because Ij(qj) minimizes the sum of total congestion cost and investment cost for
a given mass of consumers qj , Ij(qj) is called the efficient investment level given a consumer mass
qj . We define the total cost function for firm j as tj ≡ bj + vj .
3.1 Service Level Guarantee Game
In the service level guarantee (SLG) game, firms compete by setting prices pj and SLGs `j simul-
taneously. Given prices pj and SLGs `j , demand quantities for each firm are realized. Given our
model for consumers’ utility, demands will be a function of the full prices fj = pj + `j . Therefore,
given full prices, the demand quantity for firm j can be denoted dj(fj,f−j), where f−j denotes
the vector of full prices set by the competitors of firm j. (Throughout the paper we use boldface
type to denote vectors.) Finally, firms make the necessary investments to meet their SLGs given
their demand quantities. Hence, if qj consumers require service from firm j, the firm will invest
Ij to ensure that `j(qj, Ij) = `j . We analyze this game through its pure strategy Nash equilibria,
abbreviated NE.
Definition 1. A pure strategy Nash equilibrium (NE) for the SLG game is a tuple consisting of
prices pSLG, SLGs `
SLG
, full prices fSLG, investment levels ISLG, and demand quantities qSLG,
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such that each firm maximizes profit given prices and SLGs of other firms; i.e., for all j = 1, . . . , N ,
(pSLGj , `
SLG
j , f
SLG
j , I
SLG
j , q
SLG
j ) ∈ argmax
pj ,`j ,fj ,Ij ,qj
pij(pj, Ij, qj)(3)
s.t.
qj = dj(fj,f
SLG
−j )
fj = pj + `j
`j = `j(qj, Ij)
pj, `j, fj, Ij, qj ≥ 0 .
Firm j finds its optimal price and service level guarantee, given the full prices f−j of its com-
petitors. Firm j maximizes profits subject to several constraints. The first constraint states that the
number of consumers served by firm j is given by its demand function, which in turn depends on
the full prices of all the firms. The second constraint defines the full price. The third constraint
ensures firm j invests the necessary amount to meet its SLG. The last constraint ensures that all
variables are non-negative.
3.2 Best Effort Game
In the best effort (BE) game, firms compete by setting prices and investment levels simultane-
ously. Given prices pj and investment levels Ij , demand quantities qj are realized; let the demand
quantities be denoted by q = W (p, I). The main setting we consider, introduced later in Section
5, considers a demand model where services being offered are perfect substitutes. In this case,
demands in the BE game are given by a static equilibrium in which all firms that attract a pos-
itive mass of customers offer the same full price. Such an equilibrium is commonly known as
a Wardrop equilibrium, particularly in the transportation literature (Wardrop 1952). In this case
W (p, I) would denote the set of Wardrop equilibria given prices p and investment levels I .
We also analyze this game through its NE.
Definition 2. A pure strategy Nash equilibrium (NE) for the BE game is a triple consisting of
prices pBE , investment levels IBE , and demand quantities qBE , such that, each firm maximizes
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profit given prices and investment levels of other firms; i.e., for all j = 1, . . . , N ,
(pBEj , I
BE
j , q
BE) ∈ argmax
pj ,Ij ,q
pij(pj, Ij, qj)(4)
s.t.
q = W (pj,p
BE
−j , Ij, I
BE
−j )
pj, Ij ≥ 0 .
Thus in a NE, firm j finds its optimal price and investment level, given the prices p−j and
investment levels I−j of its competitors.
4. Equilibrium Analysis of the SLG Game
In order to compare the NE of the SLG game and the BE game, we must first analyze equilibria in
each of the two games. As previously discussed, equilibrium behavior in the BE game was studied
by Weintraub et al. (2007) (henceforth, WJV). In this section, we provide an equilibrium analysis
of the SLG game. Our results here constitute a novel contribution to the analysis of such games in
their own right.
The centerpiece of our approach is to first show in Section 4.1 that the SLG game is in fact
equivalent to a standard pricing game, but where costs for each firm j are given by the total cost
functions tj . We use this characterization to study the impact of cost structure in Section 4.2.
As we discuss, WJV have shown that for many congestion models of interest the function tj is
smooth and convex; in this case the SLG game is equivalent to a pricing game with convex costs.
We then show that for a class of models that exhibit constant returns to investment, the resulting
pricing game is in fact one with linear cost functions tj . These results significantly simplify the
analysis of this otherwise complex competitive scenario, as standard results for pricing games can
be applied.
4.1 Equivalence with Pricing Game
In this section, we derive a key insight for our analysis: the simultaneous pricing and SLG game
played by firms is equivalent to a standard pricing game where costs for each firm j are given by
the total cost functions tj .
We make the following assumption.
9
Assumption 2. For all j and for all f−j , firm j can choose a full price fj ≥ 0, a price pj ≥ 0,
and an investment level Ij ≥ 0, so that pij
(
pj, Ij, dj(fj,f−j)
) ≥ 0.
Assumption 2 is satisfied if, for example, for all j and for all f−j , dj(fj,f−j) = 0, for large
enough fj , and if bj(0) = 0, as is the case in many models of interest. In this situation, firm j can
choose not to serve any consumers and to make zero profits. Assumption 2 is kept throughout the
paper.
The problem that firm j solves to find its optimal price and service level guarantee, given the
full prices f−j of its competitors (problem (3)), is equivalent to:
max
fj ,Ij ,qj
(fj − `j(qj, Ij)) qj − bj(qj)− Ij(5)
s.t.
qj = dj(fj,f−j)
fj, Ij, qj ≥ 0 .
By Assumption 2 the omitted constraint pj ≥ 0 must be satisfied in an optimal solution. If not,
the firm would make negative profits. Additionally, the omitted constraint `j ≥ 0must be satisfied,
because `j is non-negative.
The optimization over Ij can be decoupled from the other variables, hence the program (5) is
equivalent to:
max
fj≥0
pij(fj,f−j),(6)
where:
(7) pij(fj,f−j) = fjdj(fj,f−j)− bj
(
dj(fj,f−j)
)− vj (dj(fj,f−j)) .
Here (through an abuse of notation) we let pij(fj,f−j) denote the profits firm j makes if it invests
optimally, when it sets full price fj , and all other firms set full prices f−j . If f ∗j solves the above
problem, we can recover the optimal solution of the original problem by setting q∗j = dj(f
∗
j ,f−j),
I∗j = Ij(q
∗
j ), `
∗
j = `j(q
∗
j , I
∗
j ), and p
∗
j = f
∗
j − `
∗
j .
It is interesting to note that in any best response calculation, firms optimally choose an invest-
ment level that minimizes the sum of total congestion cost and investment cost. In other words,
firms invest efficiently given the mass of consumers they serve. Intuitively, firms invest at the
efficient investment level because they can extract any additional social surplus generated by in-
vestment through appropriate pricing. WJV find a similar result when firms compete by setting
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prices and investment levels simultaneously; Xiao et al. (2007) also employ such a result in their
analysis of a special case of the pricing and investment game. Scotchmer (1985) finds a similar
result in pricing and investment games for club goods.
Note that problem (6) is equivalent to the optimal pricing problem of a firm that faces a demand
function dj(fj,f−j), has a cost function tj , and where its competitors prices are given by f−j .
Therefore, we have proved the following key result.
Proposition 1. The SLG game is equivalent to a pricing game, with demand functions dj and
cost functions tj for all firms j: i.e., firms compete by simultaneously choosing full prices fj , and
payoffs are given by pij as defined in (7).
Pricing games are one of the most studied models in oligopoly theory and industrial organi-
zation. Proposition 1 is useful because it permits use of the wide set of existing results in pricing
games to characterize Nash equilibria for the game where firms compete in prices and SLGs si-
multaneously in an industry with congestion effects. It is worth noting that the equivalence is valid
under weak conditions (Assumptions 1 and 2). Neither ex-ante symmetric firms, nor more specific
assumptions on the demand or cost functions are required.
4.2 Cost Structure
In this section we consider the impact of cost structure on NE in the SLG game. For many conges-
tion models of interest, the resulting total cost function tj is smooth and convex. Moreover, for an
important subset of this class of models, tj is linear. These insights have significant consequences
for the SLG game due to Proposition 1, because an important subset of results in pricing games
assume that cost functions are smooth and convex.
We introduce the following assumptions over the functions bj and `j .
Assumption 3. For all j, the production cost function bj is strictly increasing, twice differentiable,
and convex, with bj(0) = 0.2
Assumption 4.
For all j,
1. The congestion cost function `j(q, I) is finite for all q ≥ 0 and I > 0, and is twice differen-
tiable in this region. Further, for all q > 0 and I > 0, ∂`j(q, I)/∂q > 0, ∂`j(q, I)/∂I < 0
and `j(0, I) = 0. In addition, `j(0, 0) = 0, and limI↓0 `j(q, I) = `j(q, 0) =∞ for all q > 0.
2We assume throughout the paper that derivatives at zero are right directional derivatives.
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2. The total congestion cost q`j(q, I) is convex in (q, I) and strictly convex in I .3
The first part of Assumption 4 implies that congestion increases with the mass of subscribers,
incorporating the congestion effect, and decreases with investment expenditures. It also incorpo-
rates natural boundary conditions. The second part of the assumption imposes a form of convexity
over the congestion cost functions. As we discuss later in this section, many important congestion
cost models satisfy Assumption 4. We note that Assumption 4 guarantees that Assumption 1 holds.
The following straightforward result was first observed by WJV. The proof can be found in the
Appendix.
Proposition 2. Suppose that Assumptions 3 and 4 hold. For all j, the function tj is strictly in-
creasing, convex, and continuous, with tj(0) = 0. Additionally, tj(q) is twice differentiable for
q > 0.
The result implies that if Assumptions 3 and 4 hold, the SLG game can be reduced to a pricing
game with convex costs (by Propositions 1 and 2). Hence, standard results from pricing games
yield conditions over the model primitives that guarantee existence and uniqueness of NE for the
SLG game. For example if, for all j, dj(fj,f−j) is log-concave in fj (whenever dj(fj,f−j) > 0),
and additional minor technical conditions hold, then a NE is guaranteed to exist for the SLG game
(Vives 2001). Similarly, uniqueness of NE can be guaranteed using a standard diagonal strict
dominance condition (Rosen 1965).
We now demonstrate that for a wide variety of convex congestion cost models, the resulting
total cost function is linear. We consider cost models of the following form.
Assumption 5. For all j, bj(qj) = βjqj , with βj ≥ 0, and Assumption 4 holds. Further, for all j,
and all K > 0, there holds:
`j(qj, Ij) = `j(Kqj, KIj).
Under Assumption 5, for all j, there exists a function hj such that `j(qj, Ij) = hj (qj/Ij). Thus
we assume that the congestion cost depends only on the ratio of quantity to investment expenditure,
q/I . Congestion cost functions satisfying Assumption 5 exhibit constant returns to investment as
defined by WJV: if both the quantity q and investment I are scaled by a constant K, then the total
3q`(q, I) being (strictly) convex refers to q`(q, I) being (strictly) convex on the set [0,∞)× (0,∞).
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congestion cost q`(q, I) is scaled by the same constant K. We have the following important result
that we prove in the Appendix.4
Proposition 3. Suppose Assumption 5 holds. Then, for all j, there exists cj > 0 such that tj(q) =
cjq.
As a result of Propositions 1 and 3, we conclude that if the marginal cost of production is con-
stant, and the congestion cost exhibits constant returns to investment, then the SLG game is in fact
equivalent to a pricing game with constant marginal costs. This is a significant simplification from
the complexity initially presented by such models. For example, as is standard in such games, if ex-
ante symmetric firms provide perfect substitute goods then perfectly competitive pricing emerges
as the unique symmetric equilibrium.
WJV discuss several important congestion cost models that satisfy Assumptions 4 and 5, in-
cluding service provision or make-to-order facilities that can be modeled as loss systems (i.e.,
consumers leave if they find all servers busy) and where firms invest to increase the service rate.
As one example, Hall and Porteus (2000) use loss system models to analyze competition in capac-
itated systems. Xiao et al. (2007) use a similar model to analyze competition among private toll
roads. Loss systems are also a plausible model for wireless service provision, where we expect
that consumers are most sensitive to the fraction of times they are unable to connect to a base
station after paying a subscription fee to a given provider.5 Indeed, constant returns to investment
are exhibited, for example, when the marginal productivity of investment expenditure in building
capacity is constant and `(q, I) represents Erlang’s formula for a loss system with mean arrival
rate q, service rate I , and a fixed number of servers. Constant returns to investment are also exhib-
ited for alternative loss models like the loss probability of anM/M/1/s system or the exceedance
probability of an M/M/1 queue. Assumption 4 is satisfied if `(q, I) is derived from one of the
previous loss models and the marginal productivity of investment expenditure in building capacity
is nonincreasing.
We conclude by considering the analytical consequences of a congestion cost model that is not
captured by Assumptions 4 and 5; for example, suppose `(q, I) represents the M/G/1 mean steady-
4Equation (12) in the proof was also derived for a similar model studied by Xiao et al. (2007); they consider a
pricing and investment game where Assumption 5 is also satisfied. However, that paper does not establish that such
cost models lead to linear total cost functions.
5Campo-Rembado and Sundararajan (2004) use such a model to study competition among wireless service
providers.
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state delay function. WJV show that in this case v(qj) is concave in qj .6 As a consequence, if
congestion is measured as the delay in an M/G/1 queueing system, and bj is linear, the resulting to-
tal cost function tj is concave. As also pointed out by Cachon and Harker (2002), even existence of
pure strategy equilibrium may fail for such pricing games. This points to an important dichotomy
in analytical simplicity between service provision models where consumers are loss sensitive (e.g.,
where congestion cost involves the Erlang formula), and those where consumers are delay sensitive
(e.g., where congestion cost involves a queueing delay function); a similar observation is made by
WJV.
The rest of the paper analyzes industries for which Assumption 3 and Assumptions 4 or 5 hold.
In this case, the SLG game can be reduced to a pricing game with convex or linear costs.
5. Comparison of SLG and BE Games
In this section we compare competition in prices and SLGs with competition in prices and invest-
ment levels through the NE of the respective games played by firms. To characterize the SLG game
we use the results of the preceding section. The BE model was studied by WJV, and in a special
case by Xiao et al. (2007).
We begin by specializing our model: we assume that firms are ex-ante symmetric, and that
there are no production costs.
Assumption 6. For all i, j, bj = 0 (hence tj = vj), and `i = `j = `.
For technical simplicity, we also specialize our demand model to one where services are ho-
mogeneous and perfect substitutes, and demand is downward sloping. We describe this model in
Section 5.1, and provide a technical specification of demand for both the SLG and BE games. In
Section 5.2, we recapitulate the main results of WJV for the BE game under this demand model.
In Section 5.3, we compare the NE for the SLG and BE games in the case of constant returns
to investment. In Section 5.4 we compare both models in industries where the total cost function
is convex, but not necessarily linear.
6They assume that increasing investment expenditure reduces mean service time while holding the coefficient of
variation of the service time fixed. Cachon and Harker (2002) show a similar result for the M/M/1 delay function.
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5.1 Demand Model
We assume that services are homogeneous and perfect substitutes, a common simplifying assump-
tion made in competitive congestion models similar to the ones described in Section 5.1.2 (see,
e.g., WJV, Xiao et al. 2007, Acemoglu and Ozdaglar 2006). We further assume that consumers
generate a downward sloping demand function Q(f), where f is the full price in the market. Our
goal in this section is to provide a formal specification of demand for both the SLG and BE games
with the property that services are homogeneous and perfect substitutes. In Section 5.1.1, we spec-
ify our demand model in the SLG game. In Section 5.1.2, we specify our demand model in the BE
game.
5.1.1 SLG Game
Because services are perfect substitutes, all demand will go to the firm charging the lowest full
price. In case of ties, we assume that firms that set the lowest price split demand equally.
Assumption 7. In the SLG game, for all j, the demand function is given by:
(8) dj(fj,f−j) =

Q(fj) if for all i 6= j, fj < fi
Q(fj)/n if for all i, fj ≤ fi, and n = |{i : fj = fi}|
0 if for some i, fj > fi ,
where Q′(f) < 0 and limf→∞Q(f) = 0.
Recall that by Proposition 1, to analyze the SLG game it is enough to consider the pricing game
with profit functions pij(fj,f−j).
5.1.2 BE Game
To make a fair comparison between the SLG and BE games, for the BE game we consider a
static equilibrium in which firms that attract customers offer the same full price. This assumption
corresponds to the model of homogeneous and perfect substitute services. Such an equilibrium is
commonly known as a Wardrop equilibrium, particularly in the transportation literature; we adopt
the same terminology here, with the abbreviation WE (Wardrop 1952).
Let P (q) denote the inverse demand function: i.e., P (Q(f)) = f for all f > 0. We interpret
P (q) as the marginal utility obtained by an additional infinitesimal consumer when the total number
of consumers being served is q.
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Assumption 8. In the BE game, for given price and investment vectors p and I , the vector of
demand quantities q ≥ 0 is given by aWardrop equilibrium, that is,
pj + `(qj, Ij) = P (Q) , for all j with qj > 0;
pj + `(qj, Ij) ≥ P (Q) , for all j,
where Q =
∑N
i=1 qi, P
′(q) < 0, and limq→∞ P (q) = 0.
Under Assumption 4, given price and investment vectors p, I , if Ij > 0 for at least one j,
then a WE exists and is unique. The NE for the BE game is given by Definition 2, with W (p, I)
determined by a WE.
5.2 Equilibrium Analysis of the BE Game: Recap
In this section we recapitulate the main results regarding the BE game, with the demand model
given in Section 5.1.2. For the BE game, WJV show that for an important class of models satisfying
Assumptions 4, 6, and 8, if a NE exists, then it is unique and symmetric.7 Notably, any model that
also satisfies Assumption 5, and thus exhibits constant returns to investment, falls in this class.
Moreover, for all firms j, the demand quantities and investment levels are given by qBEj =
QBE/N , and IBEj = I
(
QBE/N
)
, while prices are given by
(9) pBEj = q
BE
j
(
∂`
(
qBEj , I
BE
j
)
/∂q +
1
(N − 1)/ (∂` (qBEj , IBEj ) /∂q)− 1/P ′(QBE)
)
.
WJV also show that a NE for the BE game can fail to exist, and provide conditions for which a
NE is guaranteed to exist for models that satisfy Assumptions 4, 6, and 8. Motivated by this fact,
we introduce the following assumption.
Assumption 9. A NE (pBE, IBE, qBE) for the BE game exists. Moroever, it is unique and sym-
metric. For all j, qBEj = Q
BE/N and IBEj = I
(
QBE/N
)
. Prices pj are given by equation
(9).
7The class of models considered by WJV is characterized by Assumptions 4, 6, and 8, as well as an additional
technical condition related to the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) of the congestion cost function. The MRS of I
for x is defined as follows:
MRS(I;x) = −∂`(x, I)/∂x
∂`(x, I)/∂I
.
The following technical condition is required:
∂
∂I
MRS(x; I) ≥ 1
x
.
The examples derived from loss systems discussed in Section 4.2 are included in this class; indeed, it is satisfied with
equality for any model that exhibits constant returns to investment according to Assumption 5.
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5.3 Comparison: Constant Returns to Investment
In this section we prove one of our main results: we give a sharp comparison between the NE for
the SLG and BE game in the case of constant returns to investment. While the NE price for the
SLG game is perfectly competitive and all firms obtain zero profits, firms obtain positive markups
in the unique NE for the BE game.
Suppose Assumption 5 holds, that is, the industry exhibits constant returns to investment.
In this case, the SLG game is equivalent to a standard symmetric Bertrand game with constant
marginal costs (by Propositions 1 and 3). As a result, the unique symmetric NE price coincides
with the perfectly competitive price (the marginal cost) and firms obtain zero profits (Tirole 1988).8
Therefore, in the symmetric NE for the SLG game the total demand served is the unique solution
QSLG to P (QSLG) = t′(QSLG/N), and the NE full price is t′(QSLG/N). We refer to this marginal
cost as the “perfectly competitive full price” (by analogy with standard pricing theory).
Further, because price equals marginal cost, this solution also maximizes social surplus, i.e.,
the sum of consumer surplus and producer surplus, over all demand vectors q. Additionally, recall
that in the NE all firms invest efficiently, that is, for all j, ISLGj = I
(
QSLG/N
)
(see discussion in
Section 4.1).
We note that if all firms charge full price t′(QSLG/N), then the NE price is equal to the
congestion externality, i.e., the marginal congestion effect of one consumer on the others at the
same service provider. This is expected as the congestion externality corresponds to the “so-
cially optimal” price in this context (Pigou 1920). Indeed, using Lemma 2 in the Appendix,
t′(q) = ` (q, I(q)) + q∂` (q, I(q)) /∂q. Recall that the price charged by firms in a NE for the
SLG game, pSLG, is given by the difference between the full price and the congestion cost. We
conclude that:
pSLG =
QSLG
N
∂`
∂q
(
QSLG
N
, I
(
QSLG
N
))
,
which corresponds to the congestion externality. We also refer to this quantity as the “perfectly
competitive price.”
In the NE for the BE game, firms invest efficiently, that is, for all j, IBEj = I
(
QBE/N
)
. We
know that for constant returns to investment, `(q, I(q)) is constant for all q ≥ 0 (cf. the proof of
Proposition 3). Therefore, the congestion cost perceived by consumers is the same in both the SLG
and BE game. In the BE game, however, by equation (9), the NE price exhibits a markup above
8Note that if t is linear andN ≥ 3, there are asymmetric NE. However, in all of these equilibria, the unique selling
price equals marginal cost and all firms obtain zero profits.
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the congestion externality. Using this expression, WJV show that QBE is strictly lower than the
social surplus maximizing quantity, which is equivalent to QSLG in the case of constant returns to
investment. Note that this also establishes that the full price in the NE for the BE game is strictly
higher than in the SLG game. We have proved the following key result.
Proposition 4. Suppose Assumptions 5, 6, and 9 hold. Suppose that demand systems for the SLG
game and BE games are given by Assumptions 7 and 8, respectively. Let `SLG, pSLG, fSLG, QSLG, piSLG,
and `BE, pBE, fBE, QBE, piBE be the consumers’ congestion costs, prices, full prices, total demand
quantities, and firms’ profits in the unique symmetric NE for the SLG and BE game, respectively.
Then, `SLG = `BE , pSLG < pBE , fSLG < fBE , QSLG > QBE , and piBE > piSLG = 0. Moreover,
pSLG and fSLG correspond to the perfectly competitive price and full price, respectively. Further,
QSLG corresponds to the socially optimal quantity (that maximizes the sum of consumer and pro-
ducer surplus). Finally, firms invest efficiently in both games given the mass of consumers they
serve.
The preceding comparison highlights that the choice of strategic variables has a significant im-
pact on the resulting Nash equilibria for congestion games. In industries with constant returns to
investment, competition is stronger in a game where firms choose prices and SLGs than in a game
where firms choose prices and investment levels. In the former, Bertrand price competition results
and firms cannot exercise market power. In the SLG game firms face an infinitely elastic demand at
the full price charged by the competitors. On the other hand, in the BE game, firms face a smooth
demand function at the price and investment levels chose by the competitors. Hence, competition
is less intense and firms are able to sustain markups in equilibrium. Our comparisons are simi-
lar in spirit to the well known difference between price competition and quantity competition in
standard oligopoly games (see Vives 2001, Farahat and Perakis 2006, and references therein). We
emphasize, however, that while the SLG game can be reduced to an equivalent pricing game, the
BE game cannot be reduced to an equivalent quantity competition game.
5.4 Comparison: Convex Costs
In this section we compare the NE for the BE and SLG game when Assumptions 4 and 6 hold; we
assume the total cost function t is convex. In this case, we cannot provide a sharp comparison as
in the case of constant returns to investment; we show that the NE full price for the BE game can
be above or below a NE full price for the SLG game.
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To simplify the presentation, we assume there is a perfectly inelastic demand of sizeM . There-
fore, the demand system for the SLG game in this section is given by the following assumption.
Assumption 10. In the SLG game, suppose Assumption 7 holds with Q(f) = M , for all f ≥ 0.
The definition of WE is changed to accommodate a perfectly inelastic demand. The demand
system in this section for the BE game is given by the following assumption.
Assumption 11. In the BE game, for given price and investment vectors p and I , the vector of
demand quantities q ≥ 0 is given by aWardrop equilibrium, that is,
pj + `(qj, Ij) = mink{pk + `(qk, Ik)}, for all j with qj > 0, and∑N
j=1 qj = M.
First, we characterize the symmetric NE for the SLG game played by firms under the previous
assumptions. By Proposition 1 it is enough to consider the pricing game with profit functions
pij(fj,f−j). Vives (2001) and Dastidar (1995) provide a characterization of NE for this game
when demand is downward sloping. A similar argument can be applied in the case of perfectly
inelastic demand to find symmetric equilibria. Since we are interested in symmetric NE, we will
say the full price f is a NE if all firms setting full price f is a NE. Define:
(10) fSLG =
t (M/N)
(M/N)
; f
SLG
=
(t(M)− t (M/N))
(M(N − 1)/N) .
Suppose Assumptions 4, 6, and 10 hold. Then, one can show that f can be sustained as a NE for
the SLG game if and only if f ∈ [fSLG, fSLG]. Further, fSLG ≤ fSLG, so at least one symmetric
NE exists. Moreover, the perfectly competitive full price t′ (M/N) is an element of [fSLG, f
SLG
].
If, in addition, t is strictly convex, there are no asymmetric NE, and f
SLG − fSLG > 0. The proof
of these results can be found in the Appendix.
Therefore, there exists a continuum of full prices (hence, of prices) that can be sustained as
NE for the SLG game. In any of these equilibria, all firms invest efficiently, that is, they invest
I(M/N) (see discussion in Section 4.1).
Now we study the BE game. The analysis in Section 5.2 can be specialized to a setting with
a perfectly inelastic demand. In this case, for all firms j, the demand quantities and investment
levels in the unique and symmetric NE for the BE game are given by qBEj = M/N , and I
BE
j =
I (M/N), while prices are given by pBEj = M/(N − 1)∂`
(
qBEj , I
BE
j
)
/∂q. Assumption 9 is
modified accordingly for this section. Note that in the BE game, pBE exceeds the congestion
externality; thus fBE = ` (M/N, I(M/N)) + pBE > fSLG. Therefore, in the SLG game, it is
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possible to sustain lower full prices in equilibrium; indeed, the perfectly competitive full price
can be sustained as a NE. On the other hand, in general, fBE can be smaller or larger than f
SLG
depending on the problem instance. Therefore, in some cases, the NE full price for the BE game
is larger than all full prices that can be sustained as symmetric NE for the SLG game. However,
in other cases, in the pricing and SLG game higher full prices can be sustained in equilibrium. We
provide a condition and an example below. First, we formalize our discussion in the following
proposition.
Proposition 5. Suppose Assumptions 4, 6, and 9 hold. Suppose that demand systems for the
SLG game and BE games are given by Assumptions 10 and 11, respectively. In the SLG game, a
continuum of symmetric NE can be sustained. In the pricing and investment game, there is a unique
NE. In all of these NE, each firm attracts a massM/N of customers and invests the efficient level,
I(M/N). Moreover, we have that fBE > fSLG. However, fBE can be smaller or larger than
f
SLG
depending on the problem instance.
We study the difference between fBE and f
SLG
in the following lemma; the proof can be found
in the Appendix.
Lemma 1. Suppose Assumption 4 holds. The expression fBE − fSLG has the same sign as
Mt′(M/N) + I(M/N)− t(M).
Under Assumption 4, the function t is convex with t(0) = 0 (since t = v, this follows by
Proposition 2). Hence, t′(x) ≥ t(x)/x, ∀x ≥ 0. However, if t is sufficiently “steep,” it will be the
case that t′(M/N) < t(M)/M − I(M/N)/M , hence fBE − fSLG < 0. For the first inequality to
hold we need t to be “steep” enough (relative to N ). We provide an example.
Example 1. Suppose that N ≥ 2 and that the congestion cost function is given by `(q, I) =
qr/I , where r ≥ 1.9 It is simple to check that the efficient investment level and the total cost
function are given by I(q) = q(1+r)/2 and t(q) = v(q) = 2q(1+r)/2, respectively. Substituting, we
obtain that Mt′(M/N) + I(M/N) − t(M) is positive (hence, fBE − fSLG > 0) if and only if
1 +N + rN − 2N (1+r)/2 is positive.
For example, suppose N = 4. If r = 1, fBE − fSLG > 0, hence, the NE full price for the
BE game is larger than all full prices that can be sustained as NE for the SLG game. This is not
surprising, since for r = 1 the congestion cost function exhibits constant returns to investment.
9WJV show that ` satisfies Assumption 4
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Moreover, the difference fBE − fSLG is positive for r ≤ 1.413. However, if r increases over this
value and ` and t become more “steep,” then fBE − fSLG becomes negative.
We conclude by noting that WJV show that NE for the BE game may fail to exist, even under
Assumptions 4 and 6, and provide conditions that guarantee its existence. By contrast, the previous
analysis states that Assumptions 4 and 6 (and inelasticity of demand) suffice to ensure NE for the
SLG game always exist.
6. Firms’ Choice of Contractual Agreement
Thus far, we have assumed that all firms share the same exogenously given strategy space; i.e.,
they decide prices and SLGs, or prices and investments. However, in many cases, one of the
most important strategic decisions made by firms is which contractual agreement they will offer to
customers: a SLG or BE service. Motivated by this fact, in this section we wish to study whether
an industry would naturally result in competition in prices and investment levels, or in prices and
SLGs. To investigate this question, we must allow the possibility that firms can choose the strategy
space they will use in competition. We thus introduce a multistage game where at the first stage,
each firm decides whether it will set a price and investment level, or a price and an SLG at the
second stage. We refer to the former action in the first stage as “P-I,” and the latter action as “P-
SLG.” In the second stage, each firm chooses its actions: either a price and investment level (if
P-I was chosen in the first stage), or a price and SLG (if P-SLG was chosen in the first stage). As
in most of Section 5, services are perfect substitutes and consumers generate a downward sloping
demand function. We analyze the pure strategy subgame perfect equilibria of this multi-stage
game.
Formally, let Sj denote the decision of firm j in stage 1: either Sj =P-I, or Sj =P-SLG. Let
A = {j : Sj = P-I}, and B = {j : Sj = P-SLG}. For firms j ∈ A, let pj and Ij denote the price
and investment level chosen at the second stage, respectively; and for firms j ∈ B, let pj and `j
denote the price and SLG chosen at the second stage, respectively.
Given pj and `j for firms j ∈ B, and given pj and Ij for firms j ∈ A, demand allocation
is as follows. Essentially, if any firm chose P-SLG at the first stage, and serves a positive mass
of customers at the final stage, then the full price in the market must be the full price set by that
firm. Formally, define fB = minj∈B[pj + `j], and let fA be the full price at a WE if only the
firms in A compete for consumers. If fB ≤ pj + `(0, Ij) for all j ∈ A, or A = ∅, then all firms
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in B with full price equal to fB equally split the demand Q(fB) (Assumption 7), and no firms
in A serve any customers. On the other hand, if fB ≥ fA, or B = ∅, then no firms in B serve
any customers, and firms in A split the demand according to the WE conditions (Assumption 8).
Finally, if minj∈A[pj + `(0, Ij)] < fB < fA, then the demand allocation is the unique solution to
the following equations:
pj + `(qj, Ij) = f
B, if j ∈ A, qj > 0;
pj + `(qj, Ij) ≥ fB, if j ∈ A, qj = 0;
qj = (Q(f
B)−QA)/n, if j ∈ B, pj + `j = fB;
qj = 0, if j ∈ B, pj + `j > fB,
where QA =
∑
j∈A qj and n = |{j ∈ B : pj + `j = fB}|. In other words, the full price in the
market is fixed at fB, and demand allocates accordingly: firms in A receive customers until their
full price reaches fB, and all remaining demand is split equally among firms in B with full price
equal to fB. It is straightforward to verify that these equations have a unique solution as long as
`(q, I) is strictly increasing in q for any I > 0.
For simplicity, we restrict attention to a setting where ` exhibits constant returns; i.e., we
assume that Assumption 5 holds, and that βj = 0 for all j. Our key insight is the following.
Proposition 6. Suppose Assumptions 5 and 6 hold, and that demand is allocated as previously
described. Consider any subgame at the second stage where at least one firm has chosen P-SLG in
the first stage. Then there exists a NE of the resulting second stage game; and further, in any such
NE, all firms obtain zero profits.
Proof. Since Assumption 5 holds and βj = 0, we know from Proposition 3 that t(q) = v(q) = cq
for some constant c > 0. We first prove that all firms make zero profits in the second stage
equilibrium; we then establish existence of an equilibrium.
Given a NE of the second stage game, define A, B, fA, fB, QA, and n as in the demand
allocation discussion above. Let f = min{fA, fB}; then the demand allocation implies that for
any firm j with qj > 0, we have:
pj + `(qj, Ij) = f.
The key observation is that regardless of whether such a firm has chosen P-SLG or P-I, in equi-
librium, it will invest efficiently given its demand allocation; i.e., Ij = I(qj). (WJV establish this
insight for the BE game.) Thus, for equilibrium profits we have:
pjqj − Ij = fqj − v(qj) = (f − c)qj.
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We conclude that in equilibrium, all firms j make profit (f − c)qj . Thus to establish the result,
it suffices to show that if at least one firm has chosen P-SLG in the first stage, then f = c in the
second stage NE. We assume to the contrary that f > c, and establish a contradiction.
First suppose that all firms have chosen P-SLG in the first stage. In this case, the resulting game
at the second stage is a standard Bertrand pricing game with constant marginal costs, and thus we
must have f = c. Thus if f > c in equilibrium, at least one firm must have chosen P-I in the first
stage, so both A and B are nonempty.
We distinguish two cases. First suppose that all firms i ∈ B earn zero profits; i.e., any firm
that has chosen P-SLG in the first stage has qj = 0. This implies all customers are served by firms
in A. We consider a deviation where a firm i ∈ B acquires  of the demand to serve (where  is
small). Let f  be the unique full price that results at a Wardrop equilibrium if only the firms in
A compete to serve a market with demand function Qˆ(fˆ) = Q(fˆ) − ; in other words, f  is the
unique solution to:
pj + `(qj, Ij) = f
, if qj > 0, j ∈ A;
pj + `(qj, Ij) ≥ f , if qj = 0, j ∈ A;∑
j∈A
qj = Q(f
)− .
It is straightforward to check that as → 0, we have f  → f . Therefore for sufficiently small  we
have f  > c (by continuity). We conclude that for any firm i ∈ B, there exists a deviation where
firm i sets SLG `
′
i = `(, I()), and price p
′
i = f
 − `′i. For sufficiently small  > 0, firm i will
serve  consumers at the resulting demand allocation; further, firm i earns positive profits, since
p′i − I() = (f  − c) > 0. This is a profitable deviation for firm i, so the original configuration
could not have been a NE of the second stage game.
The second possibility is that at least one firm i ∈ B earns positive profits, i.e., there exists
i ∈ B with qi > 0; let QB =
∑
i∈B qi, so Q
B > 0. Let j ∈ A be any firm in A. We consider the
following deviation for firm j. Let q′j = qj + Q
B, I ′j = I(qj + Q
B), and p′j = f − `(q′j, I(q′j)).
Note that q′j`(q
′
j, I(q
′
j)) ≤ v(q′j) = cq′j < fq′j , so p′j > 0. Under this deviation, firm j captures all
the customers currently being served by firms in B, and invests (efficiently) to keep the resulting
equilibrium full price unchanged. Thus in the resulting demand allocation, firm j attracts exactly
q′j customers, and earns profit (f − c)q′j . Since QB > 0, we have q′j > qj , and thus we have found
a profitable deviation for firm j, contradicting the assumption of NE.
Thus we cannot have f > c in the second stage NE. Thus f = c, and all firms make zero profits
in any second stage equilibrium, as required.
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It remains to establish that a second stage NE exists if at least one firm has chosen P-SLG.
Again let A be the set of firms that chose P-I at the first stage, and let B be the set of firms that
chose P-SLG at the first stage. If A is empty, then all firms play a Bertrand pricing game at the
second stage with constant marginal costs, for which all firms setting a full price f = c is a NE.
Suppose instead that A 6= ∅, and consider the following strategy profile. Let K = |A|, and
suppose that all firms j ∈ A choose Ij = I(QA/K) and pj = c − `(QA/K, I(QA/K)) where
QA = Q(c). (As above, it is straightforward to check that pj ≥ 0.) Suppose further that all firms
j ∈ B choose `j and pj so that pj + `j = c. In the resulting demand allocation, observe that all
demand is equally divided among the firms in A, and firms in B serve no customers; in particular,
all firms in B have no investment expenditure. Further, the full price at the resulting WE is exactly
c, and since all firms have invested efficiently, it is straightforward to check that all firms obtain
zero profits.
We claim the proposed strategy profile is a NE. Since all firms in B have set price plus SLG
equal to c, even if any firm in A changes its price and/or investment decision, the full price in the
resulting demand allocation cannot be any greater than c. Note that because all firms with qj > 0
invest efficiently, all firms j make profits (f − c)qj in a resulting demand allocation with full price
f . Thus a firm j ∈ A cannot earn positive profits by deviating. On the other hand, consider a firm
j ∈ B. Raising the full price (i.e., the sum pj + `j) has no effect on this firm’s profit, since it is not
serving any demand; and while lowering the full price below c attracts demand, the resulting profit
earned will be negative. Thus no firm j ∈ B has a profitable deviation either, establishing that the
proposed profile is a NE, as required.
Proposition 6 leads to the strong conclusion that if even one firm chooses to offer SLGs to
customers, then all firms “suffer” as a result: intense price competition immediately results and all
firms make zero profits. Thus the only subgame perfect equilibrium where all firms make positive
profits is the one where all firms choose P-I at the first stage, i.e., where firms compete only using
prices and investment levels (see Proposition 4).
In particular, our result suggests that if all other firms have chosen to compete by offering prices
and investment levels, a deviation to offer SLGs is not profitable. We state the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Suppose Assumptions 5, 6 and 9 hold, and that demand is allocated as previously
described. Then, the unique pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium of the two stage game
where all firms make positive profits is obtained when all firms choose P-I in the first stage, and play
the unique and symmetric NE of the pricing and investment game in the second stage. Conversely,
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in any subgame perfect equilibrium where one firm has chosen P-SLG in the first stage, all firms
earn zero profits. As a consequence, assuming firms play according to NE in the second stage,
choosing P-I in the first stage is a (weakly) dominant action.
We believe the correct way to interpret the result is that in the absence of customer differentia-
tion, setting SLGs leads to marginal cost pricing. This viewpoint implies that for constant returns
to investment, SLGs are likely to be useful only in scenarios where market segmentation is possi-
ble; in such a setting, a firm might offer a high quality SLG, and charge a high price for the service.
Only consumers who are willing to pay a large amount for such quality would subscribe to this
firm. In our model, by contrast, all consumers trade off money and congestion identically; thus
such market segmentation is not possible.
7. Conclusions
This paper compares market outcomes in service industries with two different contractual models:
best effort service (BE), and service level guarantees (SLGs). The comparison is made through the
Nash equilibria of the games played by firms. On the path to this comparison, we first characterized
equilibrium behavior in a game where firms simultaneously set prices and SLGs (the SLG game).
Our key insight is that such a game is equivalent to a standard pricing game. Moreover, for an
important class of congestion models, the pricing game yields convex or linear costs.
We used these results to compare the SLG game with a game where firms choose prices and
investment levels (the BE game), yielding insight into policy and business considerations. The
analysis crucially depends on the cost structure. In the case of constant returns to investment the
comparison is sharp; competition is more intense in the SLG game. In this case, markups are
higher and social welfare is lower in the BE game than in the SLG game. For convex costs, the
analysis is more subtle; depending on the shape of the congestion cost function, the NE full price
for the BE game can be above or below a NE full price for the SLG game. The results highlight
how the choice of strategic variables can dramatically affect equilibrium behavior in the provision
of congestible services.
Finally, in a service industry where competition takes place by simultaneously choosing prices
and investment levels, we ask whether a firm can obtain a competitive advantage by offering SLGs
instead. Our results suggest that, in the absence of customer heterogeneity and with constant
returns to investment, deviating to offer SLGs is not profitable. In future work, we plan to study
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the impact of SLGs on markets with several customer segments with different sensitivities for
congestion cost. In this case, SLGs may help to segment the market and increase profits. As with
the remainder of our work, the cost structure will of course have a first order impact on the firms’
decision of strategy space as well.
Appendix: Proofs
Proposition 2. Suppose that Assumptions 3 and 4 hold. For all j, the function tj is strictly in-
creasing, convex, and continuous, with tj(0) = 0. Additionally, tj(q) is twice differentiable for
q > 0.
Proof. The proposition is a direct consequence of the following lemma that is proved by WJV.
Lemma 2. Suppose that Assumption 4 holds. Then, for all j:
1. The function vj is strictly increasing, convex, and continuous, with vj(0) = 0;
2. vj(q) is twice differentiable for q > 0; and
3. v′j(q) = `j (q, Ij(q)) + q∂`j (q, Ij(q)) /∂q.
Proposition 3. Suppose Assumption 5 holds. Then, for all j, there exists cj > 0 such that tj(q) =
cjq.
Proof. Fix qj > 0. By Assumption 4.1, the minimization problem (2) admits an optimal solution.
For qj = 0, the optimal solution is Ij = 0. Moreover, for fixed qj > 0, `j(qj, Ij) is coercive in Ij ,
so any optimal solution to (2) must be interior. Let Ij be an optimal solution. Then Ij must satisfy
the following first order condition:
(11) −q
2
j
I2j
h′j
(
qj
Ij
)
+ 1 = 0 .
Consider the equation:
(12) y2h′j(y) = 1.
By Assumption 4, qhj(q/I) is strictly convex in I , hence, y2h′j(y) is strictly increasing. Therefore,
equation (12) has a unique solution, say y∗j . We conclude from (11) that qj/Ij = y
∗
j . This implies
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that for fixed qj , the problem (2) has a unique optimal solution, given by Ij = qj/y∗j ; i.e., the
efficient investment level is linear in qj . Substituting, we conclude that vj(qj) = qjhj(y∗j ) + qj/y
∗
j ,
which is linear in qj . The result follows because by Assumption 5, we also have bj(qj) = βjqj .
Characterizing NE of the SLGGame with Convex Costs (Section 5.4). Suppose Assumptions 4,
6, and 10 hold. Then, f can be sustained as a NE for the SLG game if and only if f ∈ [fSLG, fSLG].
Further, fSLG ≤ fSLG, so at least one symmetric NE exists. If, in addition, t is strictly convex,
there are no asymmetric NE, and f
SLG − fSLG > 0.
Proof. Through an abuse of notation, let pi(f ;n) be the profit received by a firm when n firms set
full price f and all other firms set a full price higher than f . Hence, pi(f ;n) = fM/n− t (M/n).
We first note that f is a Nash equilibrium if and only if (1) pi(f ; 1) ≤ pi(f ;N) and (2)
pi(f ;N) ≥ 0. If a firm undercuts such a full price by  > 0, the resulting profits are pi(f − ; 1) <
pi(f ;N). On the other hand, if a firm raises its full price, then it receives zero profit, so such
a deviation is not profitable (since condition (2) guarantees that the full price f is individually
rational).
Assume thatN > 1, and define f
SLG
as the unique solution to pi(f
SLG
; 1) = pi(f
SLG
;N); note
that the solution is unique since pi(f ;n) is linear in f for fixed n. Similarly, define fSLG as the
unique solution to pi(fSLG;N) = 0. Since pi(f ; 1) - pi(f ;N) is strictly increasing in f , it follows
that if f > f
SLG
then pi(f ; 1) > pi(f ;N), and if f < f
SLG
, then pi(f ; 1) < pi(f ;N). Since pi(f ;n)
is strictly increasing in f for fixed n, if f < fSLG, then pi(f ;N) < 0, and, if f > fSLG, then
pi(f ;N) > 0. We conclude that a full price f is a Nash equilibrium if and only if it lies in the
interval [fSLG, f
SLG
]. (Note that this interval may be empty, e.g., if f
SLG
is negative.)
We now show that if Assumption 4 holds, then 0 ≤ fSLG ≤ fSLG. By the definitions:
(13) fSLG =
t (M/N)
(M/N)
; f
SLG
=
(t(M)− t (M/N))
(M(N − 1)/N) ,
Note that both fSLG and f
SLG
are nonnegative, the latter because t is strictly increasing (Lemma
2). Algebraic simplification yields:
f
SLG − fSLG = t(M)−Nt (M/N)
M(N − 1)/N ≥ 0 ,(14)
where the inequality follows because t is convex with t(0) = 0 (Lemma 2). This establishes that
when Assumption 4 holds, then all symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibria of the simultaneous
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pricing and SLG game are given by full prices in the nonempty interval [fSLG, f
SLG
]. Moreover,
if t is strictly convex, f
SLG − fSLG > 0.
Now, we show that the competitive full price will be sustainable as a Nash equilibrium, that is,
t′ (M/N) ∈ [fSLG, fSLG]. From (10) we have t′(M/N) ≥ fSLG, since t is convex and t(0) = 0.
For the upper bound, note that by convexity:
t(M) ≥ t
(
M
N
)
+ t′
(
M
N
)(
M − M
N
)
.
Rearranging terms in the preceding expression, and referring to (10), we find t′(M/N) ≤ fSLG.
Hence, in SLG game, there exists a NE where all firms charge the perfectly competitive full price
t′(M/N).
Furthermore, if t is strictly convex, we can establish that no asymmetric equilibria exist. To see
this, note that if pi(f ;n) ≥ 0, then f ≥ t(M/n)/(M/n). Thus if p > n:
pi(f ; p) ≥
(
n
p
)
t
(
M
n
)
− t
(
M
p
)
.
Since t is strictly convex with t(0) = 0, it follows the right hand side of the preceding inequality is
positive; thus pi(f ; p) > 0. We conclude that if t is strictly convex, there cannot be any asymmetric
equilibria; at least one firm that is currently not attracting any demand would strictly prefer to set
full price f and capture a share of the market.
Lemma 1. Suppose Assumption 4 holds. The expression fBE − fSLG has the same sign as
Mt′(M/N) + I(M/N)− t(M).
Proof. Using the expression for fBE , f
SLG
, and the definition of t, and simplifying, we obtain,
fBE − fSLG = 1
M(N − 1)/N (M`(M/N, I(M/N))+
M2/N∂`(M/N, I(M/N))/∂q + I(M/N)− t(M)) .
By Lemma 2, t′(q) = ` (q, I(q)) + q∂`j (q, I(q)) /∂q. Hence,
fBE − fSLG = 1
M(N − 1)/N (Mt
′(M/N) + I(M/N)− t(M)) .
The result follows.
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